Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences by Aziz, Haris et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
31
2.
65
46
v4
  [
cs
.G
T]
  1
7 J
un
 20
15
Fair Assignment of Indivisible Objects
under Ordinal Preferences
Haris Aziz, Serge Gaspers, Simon Mackenzie, Toby Walsh
NICTA and University of New South Wales, Sydney 2052, Australia
Abstract
We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal
preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair
manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or ran-
domized allocations to systematically define varying notions of proportionality
and envy-freeness for discrete assignments. The computational complexity of
checking whether a fair assignment exists is studied for these fairness notions.
We also characterize the conditions under which a fair assignment is guaranteed
to exist. For a number of fairness concepts, polynomial-time algorithms are
presented to check whether a fair assignment exists. Our algorithmic results
also extend to the case of unequal entitlements of agents. Our NP-hardness re-
sult, which holds for several variants of envy-freeness, answers an open question
posed by Bouveret, Endriss, and Lang (ECAI 2010). We also propose fairness
concepts that always suggest a non-empty set of assignments with meaningful
fairness properties. Among these concepts, optimal proportionality and optimal
weak proportionality appear to be desirable fairness concepts.
Keywords: Fair Division, Resource Allocation, Envy-freeness, Proportionality
1. Introduction
A basic yet widely applicable problem in computer science and economics
is to allocate discrete objects to agents given the preferences of the agents over
the objects. The setting is referred to as the assignment problem or the house
allocation problem [see, e.g., 1, 8, 28, 32, 40, 50, 51]. In this setting, there is a set
of agents N = {1, . . . , n}, a set of objects O = {o1, . . . , om} with each agent i ∈
N expressing ordinal preferences %i over O. The goal is to allocate the objects
among the agents in a fair or optimal manner without allowing transfer of money.
The assignment problem is a fundamental setting within the wider domain of
fair division or multiagent resource allocation [23]. The model is applicable
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to many resource allocation or fair division settings where the objects may be
public houses, school seats, course enrollments, kidneys for transplant, car park
spaces, chores, joint assets of a divorcing couple, or time slots in schedules.
Fair division has become a major area in AI research in the last decade, and
especially the last few years [see, e.g., 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 23, 25, 29, 37, 44].
In this paper, we consider the fair assignment of indivisible objects. Two
of the most fundamental concepts of fairness are envy-freeness and proportion-
ality. Envy-freeness requires that no agent considers that another agent’s al-
location would give him more utility than his own. Proportionality requires
that each agent should get an allocation that gives him at least 1/n of the
utility that he would get if he was allocated all the objects. When agents’ or-
dinal preferences are known but utility functions are not given, then ordinal
notions of envy-freeness and proportionality need to be formulated. We con-
sider a number of ordinal fairness concepts. Most of these concepts are based on
the stochastic dominance (SD) relation which is a standard way of comparing
fractional/randomized allocations. An agent prefers one allocation over another
with respect to the SD relation if he gets at least as much utility from the for-
mer allocation as the latter for all cardinal utilities consistent with the ordinal
preferences. Although this paper is restricted to discrete assignments, using
stochastic dominance to define fairness concepts for discrete assignments turns
out to be fruitful. The fairness concepts we study include SD envy-freeness,
weak SD envy-freeness, possible envy-freeness, SD proportionality, and weak SD
proportionality. We consider the problems of computing a discrete assignment
that satisfies some ordinal notion of fairness if one exists, and the problems of
verifying whether a given assignment satisfies the fairness notions.
Contributions. We present a systematic way of formulating fairness properties
in the context of the assignment problem. The logical relationships between
the properties are proved. Interestingly, our framework leads to new solution
concepts such as weak SD proportionality that have not been studied before.
The motivation to study a range of fairness properties is that, depending on the
situation, only some of them are achievable. In addition, only some of them can
be computed efficiently. In order to find fairest achievable assignment, one can
start by checking whether there exists a fair assignment for the strongest notion
of fairness. If not, one can try the next fairness concept that is weaker than the
one already checked.
We present a comprehensive study of the computational complexity of com-
puting fair assignments under ordinal preferences. In particular, we present
a polynomial-time algorithm to check whether an SD proportional exists even
when agents may express indifferences. The algorithm generalizes the main
result of [46] (Theorem 1) who focused on strict preferences. For the case of
two agents, we obtain a polynomial-time algorithm to check whether an SD
envy-free assignment exist. The result generalizes Proposition 2 in [12] in which
preferences over objects were assumed to be strict. For a constant number of
agents, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm to check whether a weak SD
proportional assignment exists. As a corollary, for two agents, we obtain a
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SD EF Necessary EF NC EF
SD Prop Necessary Prop
Weak SD Prop Possible Prop
Possible EF
weak SD EF PC EF
Figure 1: Inclusion relationships between fairness concepts. Envy-freeness is abbreviated as
EF and Proportionality is abbreviated as Prop. Possible completion is abbreviated as PC.
Necessary completion is abbreviated as NC. An arrow represents inclusion. For example,
every SD envy-free outcome is also SD proportional. Double lines represent equivalence. For
example, SD EF and Necessary EF are equivalent.
polynomial-time algorithm to check whether a weak SD envy-free or a possible
envy-free assignment exists. Even for an unbounded number of agents, if the
preferences are strict, we characterize the conditions under which a weak SD
proportional assignment exists. We show that the problems of checking whether
possible envy-free, SD envy-free, or weak SD envy-free assignments exist are NP-
complete. The result for possible envy-freeness answers an open problem posed
in [12]. Our computational results are summarized in Table 1.
We show that our two main algorithms can be extended to the case where
agents have different entitlements over the objects or if we additionally require
the assignment to be Pareto optimal. Our study highlights the impacts of
the following settings: i) randomized/fractional versus discrete assignments, ii)
strict versus non-strict preferences, and iii) multiple objects per agent versus a
single object per agent.
Since the fairness concepts we introduce may not be guaranteed to exist,
we suggest possible ways to extend the fairness concepts. Firstly, we consider
the problem of maximizing the number of agents for whom the corresponding
fairness constraint is satisfied. A criticism of this approach is that there can
still be agents who are completely dissatisfied. We then consider an alternative
approach in which the proportionality constraints is weakened in a natural and
gradual manner. We refer to the concepts as optimal proportionality and optimal
weak proportionality. The fairness concepts are not only attractive but we show
that an optimal proportional assignment can be computed in polynomial time
and an optimal weak proportional assignment can be computed in polynomial
time for a constant number of agents.
2. Related work
Proportionality and envy-freeness are two of the most established fairness
concepts. Proportionality dates back to at least the work of Steinhaus [48] in
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Weak SD proportional
in P for strict prefs (Th. 7)
in P for constant n (Th. 8)
SD proportional in P (Th. 6)
Weak SD envy-free
NP-complete (Th. 11)
in P for strict prefs [12]
in P for n = 2 (Cor. 2)
Possible envy-free
NP-complete (Th. 11)
in P for strict prefs
in P for n = 2 (Cor. 2)
SD envy-free
NP-complete even for strict prefs [12]
in P for n = 2 (Cor. 1)
Table 1: Complexity of checking the existence of a fair assignment of indivisible goods for n
agents and m objects. The results in bold are from this paper.
the context of cake-cutting. It is also referred to as fair share guarantee in the
literature [41]. A formal study of envy-freeness in microeconomics can be traced
back to the work of Foley [31].
The computation of fair discrete assignments has been intensely studied in
the last decade within computer science. In many of the papers considered,
agents express cardinal utilities for the objects and the goal is to compute fair
assignments [see e.g., 9, 13, 15, 28, 35, 39, 42, 45]. A prominent paper is that of
Lipton et al. [39] in which algorithms for approximately envy-free assignments
are discussed. It follows from [39] that even when two agents express cardinal
utilities, checking whether there exists a proportional or envy-free assignment
is NP-complete. A closely related problem is the Santa Claus problem in which
the agents again express cardinal utilities for objects and the goal is to compute
an assignment which maximizes the utility of the agent that gets the least
utility [see e.g., 2, 9, 30, 42]. Just as in [12, 46], we consider the setting in which
agents only express ordinal preferences over objects. There are some merits of
considering this setting. Firstly, ordinal preferences require elicitation of less
information from the agents. Secondly, some of the weaker ordinal fairness
concepts we consider may lead to positive existence or computational results.
Thirdly, some of the stronger ordinal fairness concepts we consider are more
robust than the standard fairness concepts. Fourthly, when the exchange of
money is not possible, mechanisms that elicit cardinal preferences may be more
susceptible to manipulation because of the larger strategy space. Finally, it may
be the case that cardinal preferences are simply not available.
There are other papers in fair division in which agents explicitly express or-
dinal preferences over sets of objects rather than simply expressing preferences
over objects. For these more expressive models, the computational complexity
of computing fair assignments is either even higher [23, 27] or representing pref-
erences require exponential space [3, 20]. In this paper, we restrict agents to
simply express ordinal preferences over objects. Some papers assume ordinal
preferences but superimpose a cardinal utilities via some scoring function [see
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e.g., 16]. However, this approach does not allow for indifferences in a canoni-
cal way and has led to negative complexity results [8, 26, 33]. Garg et al. [33]
assumed that agents have lexicographic preferences and tried to maximize the
lexicographic signature of the worst off agents. However the problem is NP-hard
if there are more than two equivalence classes.
The ordinal fairness concepts we consider are SD envy-freeness; weak SD
envy-freeness; possible envy-freeness; SD proportionality; and weak SD propor-
tionality. Not all of these concepts are new but they have not been examined
systematically for discrete assignments. SD envy-freeness and weak SD envy-
freeness have been considered in the randomized assignment domain [11] but
not the discrete domain. Bogomolnaia and Moulin [11] referred to SD envy-
freeness and weak SD envy-freeness as envy-freeness and weak envy-freeness.
SD envy-freeness and weak SD envy-freeness have been considered implicitly
for discrete assignments but the treatment was axiomatic [16, 17]. Mathemat-
ically equivalent versions of SD envy-freeness and weak SD envy-freeness have
been considered by Bouveret et al. [12] but only for strict preferences. They
referred to them as necessary (completion) envy-freeness and possible (comple-
tion) envy-freeness. A concept equivalent to SD proportionality was examined
by Pruhs and Woeginger [46] but again only for strict preferences. Pruhs and
Woeginger [46] referred to weak SD proportionality simply as ordinal fairness.
Interestingly, weak SD or possible proportionality has not been studied in ran-
domized or discrete settings (to the best of our knowledge).
Envy-freeness is well-established in fair division, especially cake-cutting. Fair
division of goods has been extensively studied within economics but in most of
the papers, either the goods are divisible or agents are allowed to use money to
compensate each other [see e.g., 49]. In the model we consider, we do not allow
money transfers.
3. Preliminaries
An assignment problem is a triple (N,O,%) such that N = {1, . . . , n} is a
set of agents, O = {o1, . . . , om} is a set of objects, and the preference profile
%= (%1, . . . ,%n) specifies for each agent i his complete and transitive preference
%i overO. Agents may be indifferent among objects. We denote%i: E
1
i , . . . , E
ki
i
for each agent i with equivalence classes in decreasing order of preferences.
Thus, each set Eji is a maximal equivalence class of objects among which agent
i is indifferent, and ki is the number of equivalence classes of agent i. If an
equivalence class is a singleton {o}, we list the object o in the list without the
curly brackets. In case each equivalence class is a singleton, the preferences are
said to be strict. For any set of objects O′ ⊆ O, max%i(O
′) = {o ∈ O′ : o %i
o′ for each o′ ∈ O′} and min%i(O
′) = {o ∈ O′ : o′ %i o for each o
′ ∈ O′}.
A fractional assignment p is a (n×m) matrix [p(i)(oj)] such that p(i)(oj) ∈
[0, 1] for all i ∈ N , and oj ∈ O, and
∑
i∈N p(i)(oj) = 1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
The value p(i)(oj) represents the probability of object oj being allocated to
agent i. Each row p(i) = (p(i)(o1), . . . , p(i)(om)) represents the allocation of
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agent i. The set of columns correspond to the objects o1, . . . , om. A fractional
assignment is discrete if p(i)(o) ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and o ∈ O.
Example 1. Consider an assignment problem (N,O,%) where |N | = 2, O =
o1, o2, o3, o4 and the preferences of the agents are as follows
1 : o1, o2, o3, o4
2 : o2, o3, o1, o4
Then,
p =
(
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
)
is a discrete assignment in which agent 1 gets o1 and o4 and agent 2 gets o2 and
o3.
A uniform assignment is a fractional assignment in which each agent gets
1/n-th of each object. Although we will deal with discrete assignments, the
fractional uniform assignment is useful in defining some fairness concepts. Sim-
ilarly, we will use the SD relation to define relations between assignments. Our
algorithmic focus will be on computing discrete assignments only even though
concepts are defined using the framework of fractional assignments.
Informally, an agent ‘SD prefers’ one allocation over another if for each object
o, the former allocation gives the agent at least as many objects that are at least
as preferred as o as the latter allocation. More formally, given two fractional
assignments p and q, p(i) %SDi q(i), i.e., agent i SD prefers allocation p(i) to
allocation q(i) if∑
oj∈{ok:ok%io}
p(i)(oj) ≥
∑
oj∈{ok:ok%io}
q(i)(oj) for all o ∈ O.
He strictly SD prefers p(i) to q(i) if p(i) %SDi q(i) and ¬[q(i) %
SD
i p(i)]. Al-
though each agent i expresses ordinal preferences over objects, he could have a
private cardinal utility ui consistent with %i: ui(o) ≥ ui(o
′) if and only if o %i
o′. The set of all utility functions consistent with %i is denoted by U (%i). When
we consider agents’ valuations according to their cardinal utilities, then we will
assume additivity, that is ui(O
′) =
∑
o∈O′ ui(o) for each i ∈ N and O
′ ⊆ O.
An assignment p is envy-free if the total utility each agent i gets for his
allocation is at least the utility he would get if he had any another agent’s
allocation:
ui(p(i)) ≥ ui(p(j)) for all j ∈ N.
Note that we sometimes interpret a discrete allocation p(i) as a set, namely the
set of objects allocated to agent i. An assignment is proportional if each agent
gets at least 1/n-th of the utility he would get if he got all the objects:
ui(p(i)) ≥ ui(O)/n.
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Note that we require that the assignment is complete, that is, each object is
allocated. In the context of fractional assignments, an assignment is complete
if no fraction of an object is unallocated. In the absence of this requirement a
null assignment is obviously envy-free. On the other hand a null assignment is
not proportional.
When allocations are discrete and when agents may get more than one ob-
ject, we will also consider preference relations over sets of objects. One way of
extending preferences over objects to preferences over sets of objects is via the
responsive set extension [7]. In the responsive set extension, preferences over
objects are extended to preferences over sets of objects in such a way that a
set in which an object is replaced by a more preferred object is more preferred.
Formally, for each agent i ∈ N , his preferences %i over O are extended to his
preferences %RSi over 2
O via the responsive set extension as follows. For all
S ⊂ O, for all o ∈ S, for all o′ ∈ O \ S,
S %RSi (S \ {o}) ∪ {o
′} if o′ %i o, and
S ≻RSi S \ {o}.
Equivalent, we say that p(i) %RSi q(i) if and only if there is an injection f from
q(i) to p(i) such that for each o ∈ q(i), f(o) %i o.
Theorem 1. For discrete assignments p and q, the following are equivalent.
(i) p(i) %SDi q(i).
(ii) ∀ui ∈ U (%i), ui(p(i)) ≥ ui(q(i)).
(iii) p(i) %RSi q(i).
Proof. Firstly, (i) and (ii) are known to be equivalent [see e.g., 4, 24, 38].
We now show that (iii) implies (ii). If p(i) %RSi q(i), then we know that for
each object allocated to i in q(i), there is an injection which maps the object to
an object in p(i) which is at least as preferred by i. Hence, for each ui ∈ U (%i),
we have that ui(p(i)) ≥ ui(q(i)).
We now show that (i) implies (iii). Assume that p(i) 6%RSi q(i) . Consider a
bipartite graph G = (q(i) ∪ p(i), E) where {o, o′} ∈ E if o ∈ q(i), o′ ∈ p(i), and
o′ %i o. Since p(i) 6%
RS
i q(i), G does not have a matching saturating q(i). Then
by Hall’s theorem, there exists a set O′ ⊆ q(i) such that |N(O′)| < |O′| where
N(O′) denote the neighborhood of O′. Consider an object o ∈ min%i(O
′). We
can assume without loss of generality that O′ is maximal so that each o∗ ∈ q(i)
such that o∗ %i o is in O
′ because this only increases the difference |O′|−|N(O′)|.
Note that O′ is then {o′ : o′ %i o}∩ p(i) and N(O
′) is {o′ : o′ %i o}∩ q(i). Since,
|N(O′)| < |O′|, we have that
|{o′ : o′ %i o} ∩ p(i)| < |{o
′ : o′ %i o} ∩ q(i)| .
But then p(i) 6%SDi q(i).
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SD envy-free necessary envy-free necessary completion envy-free
SD proportional necessary proportional
possible envy-free
weak SD envy-free possible completion envy-free
weak SD proportional possible proportional
Table 2: Equivalence between different fairness concepts introduced in the literature. All
concepts in the same row are equivalent. For example, weak SD proportional is equivalent to
possible proportional.
4. Fairness concepts under ordinal preferences
We now define fairness notions that are independent of the actual cardinal
utilities of the agents. The fairness concepts are defined for fractional assign-
ments. Since discrete assignments are special cases of fractional assignments,
the concepts apply just as well to discrete assignments. For algorithmic prob-
lems, we will only consider those assignments that are discrete. The fairness
concepts that are defined are with respect to the SD and RS relations as well
as by quantifying over the set of utility functions consistent with the ordinal
preferences.
Proportionality.
(i) (a) Weak SD proportionality: An assignment p satisfies weak SD pro-
portionality if no agent strictly SD prefers the uniform assignment
to his allocation:
¬[(1/n, . . . , 1/n) ≻SDi p(i)] for all i ∈ N.
(b) Possible proportionality: An assignment satisfies possible proportion-
ality if for each agent, there are cardinal utilities consistent with his
ordinal preferences such that his allocation yields him as at least as
much utility as he would get under the uniform assignment:
For each i ∈ N, there exists ui ∈ U (%i) such that ui(p(i)) ≥ ui(O)/n.
(ii) (a) SD proportionality: An assignment p satisfies SD proportionality if
each agent SD prefers his allocation to the allocation under the uni-
form assignment:
p(i) %SDi (1/n, . . . , 1/n) for all i ∈ N.
(b) Necessary proportionality: An assignment satisfies necessary propor-
tionality if it is proportional for all cardinal utilities consistent with
the agents’ preferences.1
For each i ∈ N, and for each ui ∈ U (%i), ui(p(i)) ≥ ui(O)/n.
1Pruhs and Woeginger [46] referred to necessary proportionality as “ordinal fairness”.
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Envy-freeness.
(i) (a) Weak SD envy-freeness : An assignment p satisfies weak SD envy-
freeness if no agent strictly SD prefers someone else’s allocation to
his:
¬[p(j) ≻SDi p(i)] for all i, j ∈ N.
(b) Possible envy-freeness : An assignment satisfies possible envy-freeness
if for each agent, there are cardinal utilities consistent with his ordi-
nal preferences such that his allocation yields him as at least as much
utility as he would get if he was given any other agent’s allocation.
For all i ∈ N, ∃ui ∈ U (%i) such that ui(p(i)) ≥ ui(p(j)) for all j ∈ N
(c) Possible completion envy-freeness : An assignment satisfies possible
completion envy-freeness [12] if for each agent, there exists a pref-
erence relation of the agent over sets of objects that is a weak or-
der consistent with the responsive set extension such that the agent
weakly prefers his allocation over the allocations of other agents. The
concept has also been referred to as not “envy-ensuring” [17].
(ii) (a) SD envy-freeness : An assignment p satisfies SD envy-freeness if each
agent SD prefers his allocation to that of any other agent:
p(i) %SDi p(j) for all i, j ∈ N.
(b) Necessary envy-freeness : An assignment satisfies necessary envy-
freeness if it is envy-free for all cardinal utilities consistent with the
agents’ preferences.
For each i, j ∈ N, and for each ui ∈ U (%i), ui(p(i)) ≥ ui(p(j)).
(c) Necessary completion envy-freeness : An assignment satisfies neces-
sary completion envy-freeness [12] if for each agent, and each total
order consistent with the responsive set extension of the agents, each
agent weakly prefers his allocation to any other agents’ allocation.
The concept has also been referred to as not envy-possible [17].
We consider the assignment problem in Example 1 to illustrate some of
the fairness notions.
Example 2. Consider an assignment problem (N,O,%) where |N | = 2,
O = o1, o2, o3, o4 and the preferences of the agents are as follows
1 : o1, o2, o3, o4
2 : o2, o3, o1, o4
Consider the discrete assignment p in which agent 1 gets o1 and o4 and
agent 2 gets o2 and o3. The assignment p is not SD proportional or
SD envy-free because the fairness constraints for agent 1 are not satisfied.
However, p is weak SD proportional, possible envy-free, and weak SD envy-
free.
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Possible completion envy-freeness and necessary completion envy-freeness
were simply referred to as possible and necessary envy-freeness in [12]. We will
use the former terms to avoid confusion.
5. Relations between fairness concepts
In this section, we highlight the inclusion relationships between fairness con-
cepts (see Figure 1). Based on the connection between the SD relation and
utilities (Theorem 1), we obtain the following equivalences. The equivalences
are also summarized in Table 2.
Theorem 2. For any number of agents and objects,
(i) Weak SD proportionality and possible proportionality are equivalent;
(ii) SD proportionality and necessary proportionality are equivalent;
(iii) weak SD envy-freeness and possible completion envy-freeness are equiva-
lent;
(iv) SD envy-freeness, necessary envy-freeness and necessary completion envy-
freeness are equivalent.
Proof. We deal with each case separately.
(i) The statement follows directly from the characterization of the SD rela-
tion.
(ii) The statement follows directly from the characterization of the SD rela-
tion.
(iii) If an assignment is weak SD envy-free, then each agent either SD prefers
his allocation over another agent’s allocation or finds them incomparable.
In case of incomparability, the relation can be completed with the agent’s
own allocation being more preferred. Thus the assignment is also possible
completion envy-free. If an assignment is possible completion envy-free,
then either an agent prefers his allocation over another agent’s allocation
with respect to the responsive set extension or finds them incomparable
with respect to the responsive set extension. Hence each agent either
SD prefers his allocation over another agent’s allocation or finds them
incomparable. Thus the assignment is also weak SD envy-free.
(iv) It follows from Theorem 1 that SD envy-freeness and necessary envy-
freeness are equivalent. We now prove that SD envy-freeness and nec-
essary completion envy-freeness are equivalent. Note that an agent SD
prefers his allocation over other agents’ allocation if and only if he prefers
his allocation with respect to the responsive set extension over other
agents’ allocation.
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It is well-known that when an allocation is complete and utilities are additive,
envy-freeness implies proportionality. Assume that an assignment p is envy-free.
Then for each i ∈ N , ui(p(i)) ≥ ui(p(j)) for all j ∈ N . Thus, n · ui(p(i)) ≥∑
j∈N ui(p(j)) = ui(O). Hence ui(p(i)) ≥ ui(O)/n. We can also get similar
relations when we consider stronger and weaker notions of envy-freeness and
proportionality.
Theorem 3. The following relations hold between the fairness concepts defined.
(i) SD envy-freeness implies SD proportionality.
(ii) SD proportionality implies weak SD proportionality.
(iii) Possible envy-freeness implies weak SD proportionality.
(iv) Possible envy-freeness implies weak SD envy-freeness.
Proof. We deal with the cases separately.
(i) SD envy-freeness implies SD proportionality. Assume an assignment p sat-
isfies SD envy-freeness. Then, by Theorem 2(iv), it satisfies envy-freeness
for all utilities consistent with the ordinal preferences. If an assignment
satisfies envy-freeness for particular cardinal utilities, it satisfies propor-
tionality for the same cardinal utilities. Therefore, p satisfies propor-
tionality for all cardinal utilities consistent with the ordinal preferences.
Hence, due to Theorem 2(ii), it implies that p satisfies SD proportionality.
(ii) SD proportionality implies weak SD proportionality. Assume an assign-
ment p does not satisfy weak SD proportionality. Then, there exists some
agent i ∈ N such that (1/n, . . . , 1/n) ≻SDi p(i). But this implies that
¬[p(i) %SDi (1/n, . . . , 1/n)]. Hence p is not SD proportional.
(iii) Possible envy-freeness implies weak SD proportionality. Assume an as-
signment p is not weak SD proportional. By Theorem 2, p is not possible
proportional. Let i ∈ N be an agent such that for all ui ∈ U (%i) we have
that ui(p(i)) < ui(O)/n. But then, for each ui ∈ U (%i) there exists an
agent j ∈ N such that ui(p(i)) < ui(p(j)), otherwise n · ui(p(i)) ≥ ui(O).
Hence p is not possible envy-free.
(iv) Possible envy-freeness implies weak SD envy-freeness. Assume that an
assignment p is not weak SD envy-free. Therefore there exist i, j ∈ N
such that p(j) ≻SDi p(i). Due to Theorem 1, we get that for each ui ∈
U (%i), ui(p(j)) > ui(p(i)). Hence p is not possible envy-free.
We also highlight certain equivalences for the special case of two agents.
Theorem 4. For two agents,
(i) proportionality is equivalent to envy-freeness;
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(ii) SD proportionality is equivalent to SD envy-freeness;
(iii) weak SD proportionality and possible envy-freeness are equivalent; and
(iv) weak SD envy-freeness and weak SD proportionality are equivalent.
Proof. We deal with the cases separately while assuming n = 2. Since n = 2,
for any agent i, we will denote by −i the other agent.
(i) Proportionality is equivalent to envy-freeness. Since envy-freeness implies
proportionality, we only need to show that for two agents proportionality
implies envy-freeness. Assume that an assignment is not envy-free. Then,
ui(p(i)) < ui(p(−i)) ⇔
2 · ui(p(i)) < ui(p(i)) + ui(p(−i)) ⇔
ui(p(i)) <
ui(p(i)) + ui(p(−i))
2
= ui(O)/2.
(ii) SD proportionality is equivalent to SD envy-freeness. We note that for n =
2, if an assignment satisfies envy-freeness for particular cardinal utilities,
it satisfies proportionality for those cardinal utilities. Moreover, if an
assignment is SD proportional, it satisfies proportionality for all cardinal
utilities, hence it satisfies envy-freeness for all cardinal utilities and hence
it satisfies SD envy-freeness.
(iii) Weak SD proportionality and possible envy-freeness are equivalent. By
Theorem 3(iii), possible envy-freeness implies weak SD proportionality. If
an assignment satisfies weak SD proportionality, then there exist cardinal
utilities consistent with the ordinal preferences for which proportionality
is satisfied. Hence for n = 2, there exist cardinal utilities consistent with
the ordinal preferences for which envy-freeness is satisfied, which means
that the assignment satisfies possible envy-freeness.
(iv) Weak SD envy-freeness and weak SD proportionality are equivalent. We
have already shown that weak SD proportionality implies possible envy-
freeness for n = 2, and that possible envy-freeness implies weak SD envy-
freeness. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that weak SD envy-freeness
implies weak SD proportionality. Assume that an assignment p is not
weak SD proportional. Then, there exists at least one agent i ∈ {1, 2}
such that ∣∣∣⋃kj=1 Eji ∣∣∣
2
≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣(
k⋃
j=1
Eji ) ∩ p(i)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , ki} and∣∣∣⋃kj=1 Eji ∣∣∣
2
>
∣∣∣∣∣∣(
k⋃
j=1
Eji ) ∩ p(i)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
12
for some k ∈ {1, . . . , ki}. But this implies that∣∣∣∣∣∣
k⋃
j=1
Eji ∩ p(−i)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣(
k⋃
j=1
Eji ) ∩ p(i)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , ki} and∣∣∣∣∣∣
k⋃
j=1
Eji ∩ p(−i)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∣∣(
k⋃
j=1
Eji ) ∩ p(i)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
for some k ∈ {1, . . . , ki}. Thus p(−i) ≻
SD
i p(i) and hence p is not weak
SD envy-free.
In the next examples, we show that some of the inclusion relations do not
hold in the opposite direction and that some of the solution concepts are in-
comparable. Firstly, we show that SD proportionality does not imply weak SD
envy-freeness.
Example 3. SD proportionality does not imply weak SD envy-freeness. Con-
sider the following preference profile:
1 : {a, b, c}, {d, e, f}
2 : {a, b, c, d, e, f}
3 : {a, b, c, d, e, f}
The allocation that gives {a, d} to agent 1, {b, c} to agent 2 and {e, f} to agent 3
is SD proportional. However it is not weak SD envy-free since agent 1 is envious
of agent 2. Hence it also follows that SD proportionality does not imply possible
envy-freeness or SD envy-freeness.
Next, we show that weak SD envy-freeness neither implies possible envy-
freeness nor weak SD proportionality.
Example 4. Weak SD envy-freeness neither implies possible envy-freeness nor
weak SD proportionality. Consider an assignment problem in which N = {1, 2, 3},
and there are 4 copies of A, 6 copies of B, 1 copy of C and 1 copy of D. Let
the preference profile be as follows.
1 : A,B,C,D
2 : {A}, {B,C,D}
3 : {B}, {A,C,D}.
Clearly p, the assignment specified in Table 3 is weak SD envy-free. Assume
that p is also possible envy-free. Let u1 be the utility function of agent 1 for
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A B C D
1 1 1 1 1
2 3 0 0 0
3 0 5 0 0
Table 3: Discrete assignment p in Example 4
which he does not envy agent 2 or 3. Let u1(A) = a; u1(B) = b; u1(C) = c;
and u1(D) = d. Since A ≻1 B ≻1 C ≻1 D, we get that
a > b > c > d. (1)
Since p is possible envy-free, u1(p(1)) ≥ u1(p(2)) iff a + b + c + d ≥ 3a iff a ≤
b+c+d
2 which implies a <
3b
2 . Since p is possible envy-free, u1(p(1)) ≥ u1(p(3))
iff a + b + c + d ≥ 5b iff a + c + d ≥ 4b. Since a > b > c > d, it follows that
a > 2b. This is a contradiction since both a < 3b2 and a ≥ 2b cannot hold.
Now we show that weak SD envy-freeness does not even imply weak SD pro-
portionality. Assignment p is weak SD envy-free. If it were weak SD proportional
then there exists a utility function u1 such that u1(a) + u1(b) + u1(c) + u1(d) ≥
4u1(a)+6u1(b)+u1(c)+u1(d)
3 which means that
u1(a)
3 + u1(b) ≤
2u1(c)
3 +
2u1(d)
3 which
is equivalent to a3 + b ≤
2c
3 +
2d
3 . But this is not possible because of (1).
Since, we have shown that weak SD envy-freeness is not equivalent to pos-
sible envy-freeness, and since we showed in Theorem 2(iii) that weak SD envy-
freeness is equivalent to possible completion envy-freeness, this means that pos-
sible envy-freeness and possible completion envy-freeness are also not equivalent
to each other. We now point out that possible envy-freeness does not imply SD
proportionality.
Example 5. Possible envy-freeness does not imply SD proportionality. Con-
sider an assignment problem with two agents with preferences 1 : {a}, {b, c} and
2 : {a, b, c}. Then the assignment in which 1 gets a and 2 gets b and c is possible
envy-free. However it is not SD proportional, because agent 1’s allocation does
not SD dominate the uniform allocation.
Finally, we note that all notions of proportionality and envy-freeness are
trivially satisfied if randomized assignments are allowed by giving each agent
1/n of each object. As we show here, achieving any notion of proportionality is
a challenge when outcomes need to be discrete.
Next, we study the existence and computation of fair assignments. Even
the weakest fairness concepts like weak SD proportionality may not be possible
to achieve: consider two agents with identical and strict preferences over two
objects. This problem remains even if m is a multiple of n.
Example 6. A discrete weak SD proportional assignment may not exist even
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if m is a multiple of n. Consider the following preferences:
1 : {a1, a2, a3, a4}, {b1, b2}
2 : {a1, a2, a3, a4}, {b1, b2}
3 : {a1, a2, a3, a4}, {b1, b2}
If all agents get 2 objects, then those agents that have to get at least one object
from {b1, b2} will get an allocation that is strictly SD dominated by (1/3, . . . , 1/3).
Otherwise, at least one agent gets at most one object, and is therefore strictly
SD dominated by the uniform assignment.
If m is not a multiple of n, then an even simpler example shows that a weak
SD proportional assignment may not exist. Consider the case when all agents
are indifferent among all objects. Then the agent who gets less objects than m/n
will get an allocation that is strictly SD dominated by (1/n, . . . , 1/n).
6. Computational Complexity
In this paper, we consider the natural computational question of checking
whether a discrete fair assignment exists and if it does exist then to compute it.
The problem of verifying whether a (discrete or fractional) assignment is fair is
easy for all the notions we defined.
Remark 1. It can be verified in time polynomial in n and m whether an as-
signment is fair for all notions of fairness considered in the paper. For possible
envy-freeness, a linear program can be used to find the ‘witness’ cardinal utilities
of the agents.
Remark 2. For a constant number of objects, it can be checked in polynomial
time whether a fair discrete assignment exists for all notions of fairness consid-
ered in the paper. This is because the total number of discrete assignments is
nm.
We note that if the assignment is not required to be discrete, then even
SD envy-freeness can be easily achieved [38]. Finally, we have the following
necessary condition for SD proportional and hence for SD envy-free assignments.
Theorem 5. If p is a discrete SD proportional assignment, then m is a multiple
of n and each agent gets m/n objects.
Proof. If p is an SD proportional assignment, then the following constraint is
satisfied for each agent i ∈ N .
|p(i) ∩O| ≥
|O|
n
=
m
n
.
Each agent must get m/n objects. If p is discrete, each agents gets m/n objects
only if m is a multiple of n.
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6.1. SD proportionality
In this subsection, we show that it can be checked in polynomial time whether
a discrete SD proportional assignment exists even in the case of indifferences.
The algorithm is via a reduction to the problem of checking whether a bipartite
graph admits a feasible b-matching.
Let H = (VH , EH) be an undirected graph with vertex capacities b : VH →
N0 and edge capacities c : EH → N0 where N0 is the set of natural numbers
including zero. Then, a b-matching of H is a function m : EH → N0 such
that
∑
e∈{e′∈EH :v∈e′}
m(e) ≤ b(v) for each v ∈ VH , and m(e) ≤ c(e) for all
e ∈ EH . The size of the b-matching m is defined as
∑
e∈EH
m(e). We point
out that if b(v) = 1 for all v ∈ VH , and c(e) = 1 for all e ∈ EH then a
maximum size b-matching is equivalent to a maximum cardinality matching. In
a b-matching problem with upper and lower bounds, there further is a function
a : VH → N0. A feasible b-matching then is a function m : EH → N0 such that
a(v) ≤
∑
e∈{e′∈EH :v∈e′}
m(e) ≤ b(v) for each v ∈ VH , and m(e) ≤ c(e) for all
e ∈ EH . If H is bipartite, then the problem of computing a maximum weight
feasible b-matching with lower and upper bounds can be solved in strongly
polynomial time [Chapter 35, 47].
Theorem 6. It can be checked in polynomial time whether a discrete SD pro-
portional assignment exists even if agents are allowed to express indifference
between objects.
Proof. Consider (N,O,%). If m is not a multiple of n, then by Theorem 5,
no discrete SD proportional assignment exists. In this case, in each discrete
assignment p, there exists some agent i ∈ N who gets less than m/n objects.
Thus, the following does not hold: p(i) %SDi (1/n, . . . , 1/n). Hence we can
now assume that m is a multiple of n i.e., m = nc where c is a constant.
We reduce the problem to checking whether a feasible b-matching exists for a
graph G = (V,E). Recall that ki is the number of equivalence classes of agent
i. For each agent i, and for each ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , ki} we introduce a vertex v
ℓ
i .
For each o ∈ O, we create a corresponding vertex with the same name. Now,
V = {v1i , . . . , v
ki
i : i ∈ N} ∪ O. The graph G is bipartite with independent sets
O and V \O. Let us now specify the edges of G:
• for each i ∈ N , ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , ki} and o ∈ O we have that {v
ℓ
i , o} ∈ E if and
only if o ∈
⋃ℓ
j=1 E
j
i .
We specify the lower and upper bounds of each vertex:
• a(vℓi ) =
⌈∑
ℓ
j=1|E
j
i |
n
⌉
−
∑ℓ−1
j=1 a(v
j
i ) and b(v
ℓ
i ) = ∞ for each i ∈ N and
ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , ki};
• a(o) = b(o) = 1 for each o ∈ O.
For each edge e ∈ E, c(e) = 1.
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Now that (V,E) has been specified, we check whether a feasible b-matching
exists. If so, we allocate an object o to an agent i if the edge incident to o that is
included in the matching is incident to a vertex corresponding to an equivalence
class of agent i. We claim that a discrete SD proportional assignment exists if
and only if a feasible b-matching exists. If a feasible b-matching exists, then each
o ∈ O is matched so we have a complete assignment. For each agent i ∈ N , and
for each Eℓi , an agent is allocated at least
⌈∑ℓ
j=1
∣∣∣Eji ∣∣∣/n⌉ objects of the same
or more preferred equivalence class. Thus, the assignment is SD proportional.
On the other hand if a discrete SD proportional assignment p exists, then
p(i) %SDi (1/n, . . . , 1/n) implies that for each equivalence class E
ℓ
i , an agent
is allocated at least
⌈∑ℓ
j=1
∣∣∣Eji ∣∣∣/n⌉ objects from the same or more preferred
equivalence class as Eℓi . Hence there is a b-matching in which the lower bound
of each vertex of the type vℓi is met. For any remaining vertices o ∈ O that
have not been allocated, they may be allocated to any agent. Hence a feasible
b-matching exists.
6.2. Weak SD proportionality
In the previous subsection, we examined the complexity of checking the
existence of SD proportional discrete assignments. In this section we consider
weak SD proportionality.
Theorem 7. For strict preferences, a weak SD proportional discrete assignment
exists if and only if one of two cases holds:
(i) m = n and it is possible to allocate to each agent an object that is not his
least preferred object;
(ii) m > n.
Moreover, it can be checked in polynomial time whether a weak SD propor-
tional discrete assignment exists when agents have strict preferences.
Proof. If m < n, at least one agent will not get any object. Hence there exists
no weak SD proportional discrete assignment. Hence m ≥ n is a necessary
condition for the existence of a weak SD proportional discrete assignment.
Let us consider the case ofm = n. Clearly each agent needs to get one object.
If an agent i gets an object that is not the least preferred object o′, then his
allocation p(i) is weak SD proportional. The reason is that
∑
o≻o′ p(i)(o) = 1 >
|{o : o ≻ o′}| /n. Hence the following does not hold: (1/n, . . . , 1/n) %SDi p(i).
On the other hand, if i gets the least preferred object, his allocation is not weak
SD proportional since (1/m, . . . , 1/m) ≻SDi p(i). Hence, we just need to check
whether there exists a discrete assignment in which each agent gets an object
that is not least preferred. This can be solved as follows. We construct a graph
(V,E) such that V = N ∪O and for all i ∈ N and o ∈ O, {i, o} ∈ E if and only
if o /∈ min%i(O). We just need to check whether (V,E) has a perfect matching.
If it does, the matching is a weak SD proportional discrete assignment.
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If m ≥ n + 1, we show that a weak SD proportional discrete assignment
exists. Allocate the most preferred object to the agents in the following order
1, 2, 3, . . . n, n, n − 1 . . . , 1, . . . . Then each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} gets in the
worst case his i-th most preferred object. This worst case occurs if agents
preceding i pick the i− 1 most preferred objects of agent i. Even in this worst
case, since 1 > i/n, we have that the allocation of agents in {1, . . . , n−1} is weak
SD proportional. As for agent n, in the worst case he get his n-th and n+ 1st
most preferred objects. Since 2 ≥ n
n
+ 1
n
, by Lemma 1 we get that the allocation
of agent n is also weak SD proportional. This completes the proof.
Indifferences result in all sorts of challenges. Some arguments that we used
for the case for strict preferences do not work for the case of indifferences. The
case of strict preferences may lead one to wrongly assume that given a sufficient
number of objects, a weak SD proportional discrete assignment is guaranteed to
exist. However, if agents are allowed to express indifference, this is not the case.
Consider the case where m = nc + 1 and each agent is indifferent among each
of the objects. Then there exists no weak SD proportional discrete assignment
because some agent will get fewer than m/n objects. We first present a helpful
lemma which follows directly from the definition of weak SD proportionality.
Lemma 1. An assignment p is weak SD proportional if and only if for each
i ∈ N ,
(i)
∑
o′%o p(i)(o
′) > |{o′ : o′ % o}| /n for some o ∈ O; or
(ii)
∑
o′%o p(i)(o
′) ≥ |{o′ : o′ % o}| /n for all o ∈ O.
We will use Lemma 1 in designing an algorithm to check whether a weak
SD proportional discrete assignment exists when agents are allowed to express
indifference.
Theorem 8. For a constant number of agents, it can be checked in polynomial
time whether a weak SD proportional discrete assignment exists even if agents
are allowed to express indifference between objects.
Proof. Consider (N,O,%). We want to check whether a weak SD proportional
discrete assignment exists. By Lemma 1, this is equivalent to checking whether
there exists a discrete assignment p, where for each i ∈ N , one of the following
ki conditions holds: for l ∈ {1, . . . , ki},
∑
o∈
⋃
l
j=1
E
j
i
p(i)(o) >
∣∣∣⋃lj=1 Eji ∣∣∣
n
(2)
or the following (ki + 1)-st condition holds
p(i) ∼SDi (1/n, . . . , 1/n). (3)
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The (ki + 1)-st condition only holds if each
∣∣∣Eji ∣∣∣ is a multiple of n for j ∈
{1, . . . , ki}.
We need to check whether there exists a discrete assignment in which for
each agent one of the ki+1 conditions is satisfied. In total there are
∏n
i=1(ki+1)
different ways in which the agents could be satisfied. We will now present an
algorithm to check if there exists a feasible weakly SD proportional discrete
assignment in which for each agent i, a certain condition among the ki + 1
conditions is satisfied. Since n is a constant, the total number of combinations
of conditions is polynomial.
We define a bipartite graph G = (V,E) whose vertex set is initially empty.
For each agent i, if the condition number is ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , ki} then we add a vertex
vℓi . If the condition number is ki + 1, then we add ki vertices — B
j
i for each
Eji where j ∈ {1, . . . , ki}. For each o ∈ O, we add a corresponding vertex with
the same name. The sets O and V \ O will be independent sets in G. We now
specify the edges of G.
• {vℓi , o} ∈ E if and only if o ∈
⋃ℓ
j=1E
j
i for each i ∈ N , ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , ki} and
o ∈ O.
• {Bji , o} ∈ E if and only if o ∈ E
j
i for each i ∈ N , j ∈ {1, . . . , ki}, and
o ∈ O.
We specify the lower and upper bounds of each vertex.
• a(vℓi ) =
⌊
|
⋃
ℓ
j=1
E
j
i |
n
⌋
+1 and b(vℓi ) =∞ for each i ∈ N and ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , ki};
• a(Bji ) = b(B
j
i ) =
|Eji |
n
. for each Bji ;
• a(o) = b(o) = 1 for each o ∈ O.
For each edge e ∈ E, c(e) = 1. For each n-tuple of satisfaction conditions,
we construct the graph as specified above and then check whether there exists
a feasible b-matching. A weak SD proportional discrete assignment exists if and
only if a feasible b-matching exists for the graph corresponding to at least one of
the
∏n
i=1(ki + 1) combinations of conditions. Since
∏n
i=1(ki + 1) is polynomial
if n is a constant and since a feasible b-matching can be checked in strongly
polynomial time, we can check the existence of a weak SD proportional discrete
assignment in polynomial time.
6.3. Envy-freeness
In this section, we examine the complexity of checking whether an envy-free
assignment exists or not. Our positive algorithmic results for SD proportionality
and weak SD proportionality help us obtain algorithms for SD envy-freeness and
weak SD envy-freeness when n = 2.
From Theorem 6, we get the following corollary.
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Corollary 1. For two agents, it can be checked in polynomial time whether a
discrete SD envy-free assignment exists even if agents are allowed to express
indifference between objects.
Proof. For two agents, SD proportionality implies SD envy-freeness, and by
Theorem 3, SD envy-freeness implies SD proportionality.
Corollary 1 generalizes Proposition 10 of [12] which stated that for two agents
and strict preferences, it can be checked in polynomial time whether a necessary
envy-free discrete assignment exists.
Similarly, from Theorem 8, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 2. For two agents, it can be checked in polynomial time whether a
weak SD envy-free or a possible envy-free discrete assignment exists.
Proof. For two agents, weak SD proportional is equivalent to weak SD envy-free
and possible envy-free (Theorem 4).
We prove that checking whether a (weak) SD envy-free or possible envy-
free discrete assignment exists is NP-complete. The complexity of the second
problem was mentioned as an open problem in [12]. Bouveret et al. [12] showed
that the problem of checking whether a necessary envy-free discrete assignment
exists is NP-complete. The statement carries over to the more general domain
that allows for ties. We point out that if agents have identical preferences, it can
be checked in linear time whether an SD envy-free discrete assignment exists
even when preferences are not strict. Identical preferences have received special
attention within fair division [see e.g., 19].
Theorem 9. For agents with identical preferences, an SD envy-free discrete
assignment exists if and only if each equivalence class is a multiple of n.
Even n is not constant but preferences are strict, it can be checked in time
linear in n and m whether a complete weak SD envy-free discrete assignment
exists. This follows from an equivalent result in [12] for possible completion
envy-freeness and the fact that weak SD envy-freeness is equivalent to possi-
ble completion envy-freeness (Theorem 2(iii)). We use similar arguments as
Bouveret et al. [12] for possible envy-freeness.
Theorem 10. For strict preferences, it can be checked in time linear in n and
m whether a possible envy-free discrete assignment exists.
Proof. We reuse the arguments in the proof of [12, Proposition 4]. Let the
number of distinct top-ranked objects be k. If m < 2n − k, then there is at
least one agent who receives one object that is not his top-ranked o and no
further items. Thus he necessarily envies the agent who received o and hence
there cannot exist a possible envy-free discrete assignment. If m ≥ 2n − k,
then we run the following algorithm. (1) For each of the k top-ranked objects,
allocate it to an agent that ranks it first. Denote by N ′ the set of agents that
have not yet received an object, and order them arbitrarily. (2) Go through
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the n − k agents in N ′ in ascending order and ask them to claim their most
preferred item from those still available. (3) Go through the agents in N ′ again,
but this time in descending order, and ask them to claim their most preferred
item from those still available. The agents who got their most preferred object
do not envy any other agent if they have sufficiently high utility for their most
preferred object. For the remaining agents, who have received two objects each,
no agent i strictly SD prefers another agent j’s current allocation: even if j
(who had an earlier first turn) received a more preferred first object, i strictly
prefers his second object to j’s second object (in case j received a second object).
Therefore, there exist cardinal utilities consistent with the ordinal preferences
where the agents in N ′ put high enough utility for the second object they get
so that they are not envious of other agents even if the other agent gets all
the unallocated objects. Therefore the unallocated objects can be allocated in
an arbitrary manner among the remaining agents and the resulting complete
discrete assignment is still possible envy-free.
Bouveret et al. [12] mentioned the complexity of possible completion envy-
freeness for the case of indifferences as an open problem. We present a reduction
to prove that for all notions of envy-freeness considered in this paper, checking
the existence of a fair discrete assignment is NP-complete.
Theorem 11. The following problems are NP-complete:
(i) check whether there exists a weak SD envy-free (equivalently possible com-
pletion envy-free) discrete assignment,
(ii) check whether there exists a possible envy-free discrete assignment, and
(iii) check whether there exists an SD envy-free discrete assignment.
Proof. Membership in NP is shown by Remark 1. To show hardness we use a
reduction from X3C (Exact Cover by 3-sets). In X3C, the input is a ground set
S and a collection C containing 3-sets of elements from S, and the question is
whether there exists a subcollection X ⊆ C such that each element of S is con-
tained in exactly one of the 3-sets in X . X3C is known to be NP-complete [36].
Consider an instance (S,C) of X3C where S = {s1, ..., s3q} and C = {c1, ..., cl}.
Without loss of generality, l ≥ q. We construct the following assignment prob-
lem (N,O,%) where N = {a1, ..., a40l} is partitioned into three sets N1, N2 and
N3 with |N1| = l, |N2| = 30l, |N3| = 9l and O = {o1, ..., o120l} is partitioned
into three sets O1, O2 and O3 with |O1| = 3l, |O2| = 90l and |O3| = 27l. The
set O1 is partitioned into two sets, O
S
1 and O
B
1 , the first one corresponding to
the set of elements of S in the X3C instance and the second being a ‘buffer’ set.
We have |OS1 | = 3q and |O
B
1 | = 3l− 3q. We associate each cj ∈ C with the j-th
agent in N1. With each cj ∈ C we also associate nine consecutive agents in N3.
The preferences of the agents are defined as follows:
i : O2 ∪ ci, (O1\ci) ∪O3 for i ∈ N1
i : O2, O1 ∪O3 for all i ∈ N2
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i : f(i), O\f(i) for i ∈ N3
The function f : N3 → 2
O is such that it ensures the following properties:
For each of the three elements e of cj , three out of the nine agents associated
with cj list e as a second choice object, and list cj\{e} as first choice objects.
Let us label these three agents a1, a2 and a3. The sets of objects f(a1), f(a2)
and f(a3) each exclude a distinct
1
3 of the buffer objects O
B
1 . f(a1), f(a2)
and f(a3) each contain 2/3 of the elements of O
B . The 1/3 elements that are
excluded from each of these sets must be distinct i.e., elements that f(a1) does
not contain are contained in f(a2) and f(a3), and vice versa.
For each i ∈ N3, f(i)∩ (O2 ∪O3) = Of . Let Of contain
2
3 of the elements of
O2 and
2
3 of the elements of O3. Consider a discrete assignment that is weak
SD envy-free or possible envy-free or SD envy-free. We can make the following
observations:
(i) Agents in N2 are allocated all objects from O2 and none from O\O2. To
show this, first consider the case where 30l or more objects from O2 are
assigned to N\N2. In this case, at least one agent in N2 is envious of
an agent from N\N2: there will be an agent b1 in N\N2 with three or
more objects from O2, and there will be an agent b2 in N2 with at most
three elements, at most two of which are from O2. This is because if an
agent has more than three objects, another has at most two and if they all
have three, some of those will be objects from O1, and at least one agent
from N2 will have a second choice object. For all considered notions of
envy-freeness b2 will be envious of b1.
If 0 < z1 < 30l objects from O2 are assigned to N\N2, we have three
cases:
(a) z2 < z1 objects from O\O2 are assigned to N2. In this case an agent
from N2 has two or less objects, which implies he will be envious of
others in N2.
(b) z2 = z1 objects from O\O2 are assigned to N2. To not be envious of
each other agents from N2 will each receive two first choice objects
and one second choice object. At least one agent from N1 will receive
at least three objects from O2, making agents in N2 envious of him.
(c) z2 > z1 objects from O\O2 are assigned to N2. In this case all agents
from N2 are given three or four objects. If an agent has two, he will
be envious as before. There are not enough objects left for each
agent in N\N2 to receive three or more objects. Therefore one of
these agents, labelled b1 only has two items. Even if those two items
are most preferred items, he will be envious of at least one agent in
N1 because to any agent in N\N2 the ratio of most preferred items
assigned to N1 is higher than
1
3 . This implies at least one agent in
N1 will have two most preferred items according to b1, and since all
in N2 have at least three objects, b1 is envious of that agent.
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(ii) Each agent in N2 is allocated exactly three objects. Since as shown above
all and only O2 objects go to N2, not all agents in N2 can have four
objects. Therefore if one has four, those without four objects will envy
him since they value all objects from O2 the same.
(iii) Each agent in N2 ∪ N1 has three objects. This is because if an agent in
N2∪N1 has four or more objects, another has two or less. The argument in
the first observation still applies, and therefore this agent will be envious
of at least one agent from N2.
(iv) Agents in N1 will not be assigned any objects from O3 since they all
consider them to be second choices. To not envy agents in N2 agents in
N1 have three of their preferred choices.
(v) Each agent in N2 ∪ N3 are given two of N3’s common preferred choices,
and one of their second choices. This is the only way to avoid envy from
an element of N3 to at least one element of N2 ∪N3: if an element of N2
has two or three of N3 second choices, then another has three preferred
choices, and therefore at least one of N3 will be envious of him. If an
agent in N3 has three preferred choices, then at least one has only one
preferred choice, and will be envious of the agent with three preferred
choices.
(vi) An agent from N1 does not have objects from O
S
1 and also O
B
1 , since
otherwise at least one agent from N3 will be envious of him. This is
because of the conditions satisfied by f . There are at least three agents in
N3 who see the one or two selected elements from the three-set associated
to the N1 agent as first choice objects. For any set of elements of size two
or less in OB1 , at least one of these three agents considers said set to be
composed of first choice object. Therefore, there is at least one agent in
N3 who will be envious of an agent in N1 who selects both from O
S
1 and
OB1 , since he sees this agent as having three preferred choices whilst he
only has two (according to the previous observation).
If there exists an exact cover of S by a subset of C, then there is an SD
envy-free discrete assignment since agents corresponding to elements of C used
for the cover will be given their preferred items from OS1 and the others will be
given items from OB1 .
If there does not exist an exact cover of S by a subset of C then there does
not exist a weak SD envy-free discrete assignment (equivalently an assignment
in which no agent strictly prefers another agent’s allocation with respect to
responsive preferences). This is because even if all the previous conditions are
respected, at least one agent from N1 gets a second choice object and is envious
of agents from N2. This follows from the fact that no matter which agents of
N1 we assign buffer objects to, the remaining agents are not able to cover O
S
1
with their sets of most preferred objects. This completes the proof.
23
In view of Theorem 1, the proof above also shows that when agents have
responsive preferences over sets of objects, then checking whether there exists
an envy-free (weak or strong) allocation is NP-complete. Another corollary is
that is if agents have cardinal utilities 1 or 0 for objects, then checking whether
there exists an envy-free assignment is NP-complete.
7. Extensions
In this section, we consider two extensions of our results: (i) additionally
requiring Pareto optimality and (ii) handling varying entitlements. We show
that our algorithmic results can be extended in both cases.
7.1. Additionally requiring Pareto optimality
We focussed on fairness and only required a weak form of efficiency that
each object is allocated. In this subsection, we seek discrete assignments that
are both fair and Pareto optimal.
Let (N,O,%) be an assignment problem. A discrete assignment q Pareto
dominates a discrete assignment p if q(i) %SDi p(i) for all i ∈ N and q(i) ≻
SD
i
p(i) for some i ∈ N . We also say that q is a Pareto improvement over p. A
discrete assignment p is Pareto optimal if there exists no discrete assignment q
that Pareto dominates it.
Example 7. Consider the following assignment problem:
1 : {a, b, c}, {d, e, f}
2 : {d, e, f}, {a, b, c}
The discrete assignment that gives {b, c, f} to agent 1 and {d, e, a} to agent 2
is SD proportional. However it is not Pareto optimal since it is SD-dominated
by the assignment in which agent 1 gets {a, b, c} and agent 2 gets {d, e, f}.
Let (N,O,%) be an assignment problem and p be a discrete assignment.
We will create an auxiliary assignment problem and assignment where each
agent is allocated exactly one object. The clones of an agent i ∈ N are the
agents in N ′i = {io : o ∈ O and p(i)(o) = 1}. The cloned assignment problem
corresponding to assignment problem (N,O,%) and assignment p is (N ′, O,%′)
such that N ′ =
⋃
i∈N N
′
i . and for each io ∈ N
′, %′io=%i. The cloned assignment
of p is the discrete assignment p′ in which p′(io)(o) = 1 if p(i)(o) = 1 and
p′(io)(o) = 0 otherwise.
A cloned assignment can easily be transformed back into the original assign-
ment where each agent i ∈ N is allocated all the objects assigned by p′ to the
clones of i.
Lemma 2. A discrete assignment is Pareto optimal if and only if its cloned
assignment is Pareto optimal for the cloned assignment problem.
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Proof. Let (N,O,%) be an assignment problem and p be a discrete assignment.
We will prove that p is not Pareto optimal if and only if its cloned assignment
p′ is not Pareto optimal for the cloned assignment problem (N ′, O,%′).
For the backwards direction, assume that p′ is not Pareto optimal for (N ′, O,
%′). Then, there exists another discrete assignment p′∗ in which each of the
cloned agents get at least as preferred an object and at least one agent gets
a strictly more preferred object. But if p′∗ is transformed into the discrete
assignment p∗ for the original assignment problem, then p∗ Pareto dominates p.
For the forward direction, assume that p is not Pareto optimal. Then, there
exists another discrete assignment p∗ that Pareto dominates it. But this implies
that the cloned assignment of p∗ also Pareto dominates p′ in (N ′, O,%′) (modulo
name changes among clones).
Lemma 3. If a discrete assignment is not Pareto optimal, a Pareto improve-
ment that is Pareto optimal can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. We first take the assignment problem and the given discrete assignment
and construct the corresponding cloned assignment problem and cloned assign-
ment. For such a cloned discrete assignment, a Pareto optimal Pareto improve-
ment can be computed in polynomial time [see e.g., 6]. The updated cloned
assignment is then transformed back into an assignment for the original assign-
ment problem.
Remark 3. A Pareto improvement over a weak SD proportional or SD propor-
tional discrete assignment is weak SD proportional or SD proportional, respec-
tively. Therefore, if a (weak) SD proportional discrete assignment exists then
there also exists a Pareto optimal and (weak) SD proportional discrete assign-
ment.
Based on Lemma 3 and Remark 3 we obtain the following theorems.
Theorem 12. If a Pareto optimal and SD proportional discrete assignment
exists, it can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 13. For a constant number of agents, if a Pareto optimal and weak
SD proportional discrete assignment exists, it can be computed in polynomial
time.
7.2. Unequal entitlements
Throughout this paper, we assumed that each agent has the same entitlement
to the objects. However, it could be the case that an agent i ∈ N has entitlement
ei. There can be various reasons for unequal entitlements. An agent may be
given more entitlement for the resources to reward his contributions and effort
in obtaining the objects for the set of objects. Entitlements can also be used
to model justified demand. For example, if an agent represents a different
number of sub-agents, the agent who represents more sub-agents may have more
entitlement. Unequal entitlements have been considered in the fair division
literature (see, e.g., [22, page 44].
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In the case of unequal entitlements, proportionality and envy-freeness can
be redefined:
ui(p(i)) ≥
ei∑
j∈N ej
∑
o∈O
ui(o) for each i ∈ N
for proportionality and
ui(p(i)) ≥
ei
ej
ui(p(j)) for each i, j ∈ N
for envy-freeness. For envy-freeness, the idea is that if agent i has half the enti-
tlement of agent j, then i will only be envious of agent j if agent’s j allocation
gives agent i more than twice the utility agent i has for his own allocation.
Just like possible and necessary fairness is defined for equal entitlements, the
definitions can be extended for the case of unequal entitlements. Hence possi-
ble and necessary proportionality and envy-freeness are natural ordinal notions
that can also take into account entitlements. Our two algorithms for possible
and necessary proportionality can also be modified to cater for entitlements by
replacing 1/n with ei∑
j∈N
ej
whenever a matching lower bound is specified for a
vertex.
Theorem 14. For a constant number of agents, it can be checked in polynomial
time whether a possible proportional discrete assignment exists even if agents
have different entitlements.
Theorem 15. It can be checked in polynomial time whether a necessary pro-
portional discrete assignment exists.
8. Fairness Concepts that Guarantee the Existence of Fair Outcomes
We observed that there are instances where even the weakest fairness no-
tions such as weak SD proportionality cannot be guaranteed. Hence the fair-
ness notions considered are not proper solution concepts. In this section, we
propose fairness concepts that always suggest a non-empty set of assignments
with meaningful fairness properties.
8.1. Maximal and Maximum Fairness
We first seek a way out by considering corresponding solution concepts that
maximize the number of agents being satisfied with their allocation. The idea
has been used in matching theory where for example if a stable matching does
not exist, then one may aim to minimize the number of unstable pairs (see, e.g.,
[10]). For each fairness notion X ∈ {SD envy-freeness,weak SD envy-freeness,
possible envy-freeness, SD proportionality,weak SD proportionality}, we define
the following concepts:
(i) Maximum X : a discrete assignment p satisfies MaximumX if it maximizes
the total number of agents for which the fairness condition according to
X is satisfied.
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(ii) Maximal X : a discrete assignment p satisfies Maximal X if the fairness
condition according to X cannot be be satisfied for any more agents while
maintaining the fairness condition for agents who are satisfied by p.
The following lemmas are useful in relating the complexity of fairness concept
X with Maximum X and Maximal X . The proofs are straightforward.
Lemma 4. If there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a discrete
assignment that is Maximum X then there exists a polynomial-time algorithm
to compute a discrete assignment satisfying X if one exists.
Proof. Simply compute the Maximum X and check whether the fairness con-
dition is satisfied for each agent. If not, then the fairness condition cannot be
satisfied for each agent and hence no X discrete assignment exists.
Corollary 3. Computing a maximum SD envy-free discrete assignment is NP-
hard.
Lemma 5. If there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to check whether a dis-
crete assignment satisfying X exists, then the problem of computing a Maximal
X discrete assignment can also be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. We describe the reduction. Initialize S, the set of agents for which the
fairness condition can be met, to the empty set. Check whether there exists an
agent j ∈ N \ S that can be moved to S such that there still exists a discrete
assignment that satisfies the fairness condition according to X for agents in S.
If yes, then move j to S. Repeat the process until the set S cannot be grown.
Hence S is the maximal set of agents that can be satisfied.
Corollary 4. A maximal SD proportional discrete assignment can be computed
in polynomial time.
Corollary 5. A maximal weak SD proportional discrete assignment can be com-
puted in polynomial time if n is a constant.
Figure 2 illustrates the polynomial-time reductions between computational
problems for fairness concept X ∈ {envy-freeness, proportionality, SD envy–
freeness, weak SD envy-freeness, possible envy-freeness, weak SD proportional-
ity, SD proportionality}.
8.2. Optimal proportionality
A possible criticism of maximal and maximum fairness is that the fairness
constraint of each agent is strong enough so that it is not possible to satisfy it
for each agent. Hence those agents that do not have their fairness constraints
satisfied may not view the assignment as fair from their perspective. To counter
this criticism, we weaken the fairness constraint in a uniform way which leads
to attractive fairness concepts called optimal proportionality and optimal weak
proportionality. The concepts are similar to egalitarian equivalence rule for
continuous resource settings [43]. For continuous settings, an allocation satisfies
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MaximalX
ExistsX
MaximumX
Figure 2: Polynomial-time reductions between computational problems for fairness concept
X ∈ {envy-freeness, proportionality, SD envy–freeness, weak SD envy-freeness, possible envy-
freeness, weak SD proportionality, SD proportionality}.
egalitarian equivalence if each agent is indifferent between his allocation and
the reference resource bundle. Since we consider only ordinal preferences, we
exploit the SD relations to define suitable concepts. Moreover, since we consider
discrete assignments, we relax the requirement of each agent’s allocation being
equivalent to the reference allocation.
We say that an assignment satisfies 1/α proportionality if
p(i) %SDi (1/α, . . . , 1/α) for all i ∈ N.
We note that 1/n proportionality is equivalent to SD proportionality. An as-
signment satisfies optimal proportionality if
p(i) %SDi (1/α, . . . , 1/α) for all i ∈ N.
for the smallest possible α. We will refer to the smallest such α as α∗ and call
1/α∗ as the optimal proportionality value.
We point out that Theorem 6 can be generalized from 1/n proportionality
to 1/α proportionality for any value of α:
Theorem 16. It can be checked in polynomial time whether a discrete 1/α
proportional assignment exists even if agents are allowed to express indifference
between objects.
Proof. The algorithm and proof is identical to that of the algorithm in the proof
of Theorem 6. The only difference is that for each i ∈ N and ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , ki}, the
lower bound of each vertex is set to a(vℓi ) =
⌈∑ℓ
j=1|E
j
i |
α
⌉
−
∑ℓ−1
j=1 a(v
j
i ) instead
of
⌈∑
ℓ
j=1|E
j
i |
n
⌉
−
∑ℓ−1
j=1 a(v
j
i ).
The algorithm in the proof of Theorem 16 can be used to check the existence
of a 1/α proportional assignment for different values of α. However, among other
cases, ifm < n, then we know that a 1/α proportional assignment does not exist
for any finite value of α. We first characterize the settings that admit a 1/α
proportional assignment for some finite α.
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Lemma 6. α∗ is finite iff there exists an assignment in which each agent gets
one of his most preferred objects.
Proof. In case each agent gets one of his most preferred objects, proportionality
is satisfied for α∗ = mn. If α∗ is finite, then each agent’s proportionality
constraint with respect to the first equivalence class is satisfied. Hence for some
finite α∗, ∣∣p(i) ∩ E1i ∣∣ ≥ |E1i |α∗ .
Hence each i gets at least one of his most preferred objects.
Since α is a positive real in the interval (0,∞], it appears that even binary
search cannot be used to find the optimal proportional assignment in polynomial
time. Next, we show that interestingly we only need to check a polynomial
number of values of α to find the optimal proportional assignment.
Theorem 17. An optimal proportional assignment can be computed in polyno-
mial time even if agents are allowed to express indifference between objects.
Proof. If there exists no assignment in which each agent gets one of his most
preferred objects, then α∗ is infinite. This means the first proportionality con-
straint of agents cannot be simultaneously satisfied for a finite α∗. In that case
any arbitrary assignment satisfies optimality proportionality with α∗ = ∞. In
case there exists an assignment in which each agent gets one of his most preferred
objects, then α∗ is finite. We show how to compute such an α∗ as well as the
assignment corresponding to it. An assignment p satisfies 1/α proportionality
if for each i ∈ N and each k ∈ {1, . . . , ki},∣∣∣∣∣∣p(i) ∩
k⋃
j=1
Eji
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
|
⋃k
j=1 E
j
i |
α
. (4)
Since ki ≤ m, there are in total mn such constraints. Since the left hand side
of each such constraint is an integer, the overall constraint is tight if∣∣∣∣∣∣p(i) ∩
k⋃
j=1
Eji
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
⌈
|
⋃k
j=1 E
j
i |
α
⌉
.
If the value of α is such that no proportionality constraint is tight then this
means that α is not optimal. Therefore, we can restrict our attention to those
values of α for which at least one of the constraints of the type in (4) is tight.
When a constraint is tight, both sides of the constraint take one of the values
from the set {1, . . . ,m}. No constraint can take value 0 because we know that
α∗ is finite and that there exists an assignment in which each agent gets one of
his most preferred objects. For the tight constraint∣∣∣∣∣∣p(i) ∩
k⋃
j=1
Eji
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
|
⋃k
j=1 E
j
i |
α
∈ (ℓ, ℓ+ 1]
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for some ℓ ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}. This constraint is tight for one of the following
values of α: {
|
⋃k
j=1 E
j
i |
ℓ+ 1
: ℓ ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}
}
It follows that if we restrict α to those values for which at least one propor-
tionality constraint is tight, then we just need to consider at most nm2 values
of α all of which are rationals. For each of these values, we check whether a 1/α
proportional assignment exists or not. The smallest α for which a 1/α propor-
tional assignment exists is the optimal α = α∗. The assignment is the optimal
proportional assignment.
We note that if an SD proportional assignment exists, then it is also an
optimal proportional assignment.
Theorem 18. SD proportionality implies optimal proportionality irrespective
of whether the assignments are discrete or not.
Proof. Assume that assignment p is SD proportional not an optimal propor-
tional assignment. Then, we know that it is 1/n proportional. Assume for
contradiction that p is 1/α proportional for α < n. But this means that for
each i ∈ N , the following constraint is satisfied.
|p(i) ∩O| ≥
|O|
α
.
Since α < n, it follows that |O|
α
> |O|
n
. But if each agent gets more than |O|
n
objects, then the number of objects is more than |O| which is a contradiction.
We show that even if an SD proportional assignment does not exist, an
optimal proportional assignment suggests a desirable allocation of objects.
Example 8. Assume that the preferences of the agents are as follows.
1 : {o1, o2, o3}
2 : {o1, o2, o3}
Since m is not a multiple of n, an SD proportional assignment does not exist.
Now consider the assignment p that gives two objects to one agent and one
object to the other. It is an optimal proportional assignment where the optimal
proportionality value is 1/3.
Optimal proportionality seems to be a useful fairness concept for ordinal
settings. It guarantees the existence of an assignment that satisfies a fairness
notion along the lines of proportionality. If each agent cannot get a most pre-
ferred object, then the optimal proportionality value reached is 1/∞ = 0. If the
optimal proportionality value is 0, then one can modify the preference profile by
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gradually merging the first few equivalence classes of the agents. If m > n, then
after merging enough equivalence classes of the agents, one can ensure that the
optimal proportional value for the modified profile is finite. An optimal propor-
tional assignment for the modified preference profile stills seems to constitute a
desirable and fair assignment for the original preference profile. We note that in
contrast to the ordinal setting, when agents have cardinal utilities, even checking
whether there exists a proportional assignment is NP-complete [15, 39].
8.3. Optimal weak proportionality
Just like the concept of SD proportionality can be used to define optimal
proportionality, weak SD proportionality can be used to define optimal weak
proportionality. We say that an assignment satisfies 1/β weak proportionality if
(1/β, . . . , 1/β) ⊁SDi p(i) for all i ∈ N.
We note that 1/n weak proportionality is equivalent to weak SD proportionality.
An assignment satisfies optimal weak proportionality if
(1/β, . . . , 1/β) ⊁SDi p(i) for all i ∈ N.
for the infimum of the set {β | ∃ a 1/β weak proportional assignment}. We
will refer to the infimum as β∗ and call 1/β∗ as the optimal weak proportionality
value.
We point out that Theorem 8 can be generalized from 1/n proportionality
to 1/β proportionality for any value of β:
Theorem 19. For a constant number of agents, it can be checked in polynomial
time whether a 1/β weak proportional discrete assignment exists even if agents
are allowed to express indifference between objects.
Proof. The algorithm and proof is identical to that of the algorithm in the proof
of Theorem 8. The only difference in the algorithm is in the lower bounds of
vertices.
• a(vℓi ) =
⌊
|
⋃ℓ
j=1
E
j
i |
β
⌋
+1 and b(vℓi ) =∞ for each i ∈ N and ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , ki};
• a(Bji ) = b(B
j
i ) =
|Eji |
β
. for each Bji ;
• a(o) = b(o) = 1 for each o ∈ O.
The algorithm in the proof of Theorem 19 can be used to check the existence
of a 1/β weak proportional assignment for different values of β. However, among
other cases, if m < n, then we know that a 1/β weak proportional assignment
does not exist for any finite value of β.
Lemma 7. For any assignment setting, β∗ ≥ 1.
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Proof. Assume for contradiction that β∗ < 1. This means that there exists
a discrete assignment p such that for each agent i ∈ N , either p(i) ∼SDi
(1/β∗, . . . , 1/β∗) or
∣∣∣p(i) ∩⋃kj=1 Eji ∣∣∣ > |⋃kj=1 Ei|β∗ for some k. Note that the
former condition is not feasible because it means that p(i) ≻RSi O. For the
latter condition, since β∗ < 1, therefore
∣∣∣p(i) ∩⋃kj=1 Eji ∣∣∣ > |⋃kj=1 Eji |. But this
is a contradiction.
Next, we characterize those assignment settings for which β∗ is finite.
Lemma 8. β∗ is finite if and only if m ≥ n.
Proof. If β∗ is finite, then at least one of each agent’s weak β∗ proportionality
constraint is satisfied. This implies that each agent gets at least one object
which means that m ≥ n.
Assume that m ≥ n. Hence there exists an assignment in which each agent
gets one object. In the worst case, some agent i ∈ N gets only one object that
is also his least preferred. Even then p(i) ≻SDi (1/β, . . . , 1/β) if 1/β < 1/m.
Hence p is weak 1/β weak proportional for any finite β > m.
Next, we show that if the number of agents is constant, an optimal weak
proportional assignment can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 20. If the number of agents is constant, a discrete optimal weak
proportional assignment can be computed in polynomial time even if agents are
allowed to express indifference between objects.
Proof. If m < n, then by Lemma 8, β∗ is infinite and at least one agent cannot
get an object. In that case, any assignment satisfies 1/∞ weak proportionality.
If m ≥ n, then by Lemma 8, β∗ is finite, we show how to compute such a β∗ as
well as the assignment corresponding to it. Assume that β∗ is such that there
exists at least one i ∈ N such that p(i) ∼SDi (1/β
∗, . . . , 1/β∗). In this case, for
each j ∈ {1, . . . , ki} i gets
|Ej
i
|
β∗
objects from p(i) ∩ Eji . Since |E
j
i | ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
and |p(i) ∩ Eji | ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, β
∗ takes one of at most O(m2) values from set
{a/b : a, b ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, a > b}.
Now let us assume that β∗ is such that there exists no i ∈ N such that
p(i) ∼SDi (1/β
∗, . . . , 1/β∗). In that case for each agent i ∈ N , an assignment p
satisfies 1/β proportionality if for each i ∈ N and some k ∈ {1, . . . , ki},∣∣∣∣∣∣p(i) ∩
k⋃
j=1
Eji
∣∣∣∣∣∣ >
|
⋃k
j=1 E
j
i |
β
. (5)
For an arbitrarily small rational ǫ > 0, this constraint is equivalent to∣∣∣∣∣∣p(i) ∩
k⋃
j=1
Eji
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
⌈
|
⋃k
j=1 E
j
i |
β − ǫ
⌉
.
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Since ki ≤ m, there are in total mn such constraints. Since the left hand
side of each such constraint is an integer, the overall constraint is tight if∣∣∣∣∣∣p(i) ∩
k⋃
j=1
Eji
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
⌈
|
⋃k
j=1 E
j
i |
β − ǫ
⌉
. (6)
If the value of β − ǫ is such that no proportionality constraint is tight then
this means that β − ǫ is not optimal. Therefore, we can restrict our attention
to those values of β − ǫ for which at least one of the constraints of the type in
(6) is tight. When a constraint is tight, both sides of the constraint take one of
the values from the set {1, . . . ,m}. For the tight constraint,∣∣∣∣∣∣p(i) ∩
k⋃
j=1
Eji
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
|
⋃k
j=1 E
j
i |
β − ǫ
∈ (ℓ, ℓ+ 1]
for some ℓ ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}. This constraint is tight for one of the following
values of β − ǫ: {
|
⋃k
j=1 E
j
i |
ℓ+ 1
: ℓ ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}
}
It follows that if we restrict β − ǫ to those values for which at least one
proportionality constraint is tight, then we just need to consider at most nm2
values of β − ǫ all of which are rationals. We can informally consider these
values as the values of β because β − ǫ is a tiny perturbation of β. For each
of the values, we check whether a 1/β proportional assignment exists or not.
Similarly, for each of the values from the set β ∈ {a/b :a, b ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, a > b},
we check whether a β weak proportional assignment exists or not. The smallest
β for which a 1/β assignment exists is β∗.
It remains open whether the theorem above can be generalized to the case
where the number of agents is not constant. We note that whereas an SD
proportional assignment is an optimal proportional assignment (Theorem 18),
a weak SD proportional assignment may not be an optimal weak proportional
assignment.
Example 9. Assume that the preferences of the agents are as follows.
1 : o1, o2, o3, o4, o5
2 : {o2, o3}, {o1, o4, o5}
Note that the discrete assignment p that gives {o2, o3} to agent 1 and the other
objects to agent 2 is weak SD proportional. In fact it is not only 1/2 weak
proportional but (3/5− ǫ) weak proportional where ǫ > 0 is arbitrarily small. It
is not 1/β weak proportional for 1/β < 3/5.
We now consider a discrete assignment q, that gives {o1} to agent 1 and the
other objects to agent 2. It is easily seen that q is (1−ǫ) weak proportional where
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ǫ > 0 is arbitrarily small. Since the weak SD proportional assignment p is not
1/β weak proportional for 1/β < 3/5 but there exists another discrete assignment
q that is (1− ǫ) weak proportional, it shows that a weak SD proportional discrete
assignment may not be an optimal weak proportional assignment.
Next, we provide further justification for optimal weak proportionality. Op-
timal weak proportionality is equivalent to an established fairness concept called
maximin defined for a restricted domain. When n = m and preferences of agents
are strict, Brams and King [21] defined an assignment satisfying maximin if it
maximizes the minimum rank of items that any player receives. We show that
for n = m and strict preferences, maximin is equivalent to optimal weak pro-
portional.
Theorem 21. For n = m and strict preferences, maximin is equivalent to
optimal weak proportional.
Proof. Assume that each agent gets an object that is at least his k-th ranked
object. Then the assignment satisfies 1/(k − ǫ) weak proportionality for some
arbitrarily small ǫ > 0. We now assume that an assignment satisfies 1/(k − ǫ)
weak proportionality for some arbitrarily small ǫ > 0. In that case we know
that each agent gets an object that is k-th or higher ranked.
9. Conclusions
We have presented a taxonomy of fairness concepts under ordinal preferences,
and identified the relationships between the concepts. Compared to refinements
of the responsive set extension to define fairness concepts [12], using cardinal
utilities and the SD relation to define fairness concepts not only gives more
flexibility (for example reasoning about entitlements) but can also be convenient
for algorithm design.
A problem with the fairness concepts presented in the paper was that the
set of fair outcomes is not guaranteed to be non-empty. In view of this we high-
lighted in Section 8 how alternative notions of maximal and maximum fairness
are useful and how the respective computational problems are related to each
other. Another possible way to circumvent non-existence of SD proportional or
weak SD proportional assignments is to define less stringent notions by replac-
ing the reference vector ( 1
n
, . . . , 1
n
) with a reference vector with 1/n replaced
by some constant. We show that an optimal proportional discrete assignment
can be computed in polynomial time whereas an optimal weak proportional dis-
crete assignment can be computed in polynomial time if the number of agents
is bounded. Both fairness notions appear to promising solution concepts for
fair division of indivisible objects. They are also compatible with Pareto opti-
mality. The optimal notions can be be further refined with respect to leximin
refinements.
There are number of directions for future research. The complexity of find-
ing a weak SD proportional discrete assignment remains open for an unbounded
number of agents with non-strict preferences. The complexity of checking
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whether an SD envy-free assignment exists for a bounded number of agents
is open. It will be interesting to see how various approximation algorithms
in the literature designed to reduce envy or maximize welfare fare in terms of
satisfying ordinal notions of fairness (see, e.g., [9, 13, 39]). Examining other
dominance notions may also be fruitful [34]. Another avenue for positive al-
gorithmic results is to consider parameterized algorithms. Finally, strategic
aspects of ordinal fairness is another interesting direction for future research.
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